{"id":15423,"date":"2021-02-24T15:40:02","date_gmt":"2021-02-24T14:40:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/?p=15423"},"modified":"2024-02-13T23:13:56","modified_gmt":"2024-02-13T22:13:56","slug":"montenegro-between-the-east-and-west-who-will-prevail-in-the-land-of-seas-and-mountains","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/news\/montenegro-between-the-east-and-west-who-will-prevail-in-the-land-of-seas-and-mountains\/","title":{"rendered":"Montenegro between the East and West: Who will prevail in the \u2018land of seas and mountains\u2019?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Azra Karastanovi\u0107, Program Manager at the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, contributed to a broad study on the strategic role of the external actors in the Western Balkans. This is a joint publication of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, the Political Academy of the Austrian People \u0301s Party and the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy. \u201cMontenegro between the East and West: Who will prevail in the \u2018land of seas and mountains\u2019?\u201d<\/em> is the topic of Azra\u2019s article. We are conveying the article integrally. The whole study can be found on the following link<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Montenegro ignites the strategic interests of the regional and global powers. Particularly, for the past decade, it has been under influence of both Western and non-Western actors. This paper seeks to identify, analyse, and present the means of influence of five major players in Montenegro\u2014Russia, China, Turkey, the EU, and the US. Each of  the  external  actors\u2019 footprint  within  Montenegro  has  been  assessed  against  the respective factors of influence: economic, political, security, religious, and media. In this context, external actors\u2019 influence is understood as the capacity or power of these actors to  produce  effects  on  the  political,  economic,  and  social  affairs within  the  country  that favour their national interests. The paper shows the growing presence and influence of non-Western  actors  within  Montenegro,  as the  prevalence of  the  EU  and  US  influence has been decreasing for the past decade and lacks visibility despite strong economic and political presence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Keywords:Montenegro\u2013US\u2013EU\u2013Turkey\u2013China\u2013Russia\u2013footprint\u2013influence<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Montenegro is one of the seven countries born out of the violent dissolution of the Socialist Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia  (SFRY).  Even  though  it  was  mostly spared  from the violence  and  bloodshed  of  the  war,  as  one  of  the  smallest  countries  in  the  Western Balkans,  its  political,  economic,  and  social  progress  was  very  much  conditioned  by  a series  of  internal  and  external  factors\u2014in  the  first  place  by  efforts  to  regain  its independence. This endeavour, which was ten years in the making, was crowned in 2006 with  the  historic  independence  referendum.  However,  this  was  only  the  beginning. Regaining   independence   meant   strengthening   institutions,   stepping   out   on   the international scene, building up the economy, closing the gap, and unifying society. An endeavour which is still in the making. Since regaining its independence in 2006, Montenegro set out two principal foreign-policy goals\u2014becoming part of the EU and of NATO. The latter one was accomplished in 2017,despite a strong backlash and efforts by external actors (primarily Russia) to prevent it. The  first  still waits to  be  achieved,  even  though  Montenegro  is  considered  one  of  the frontrunners   for   future   EU   enlargement.   Growing non-Western   influence is   a consequence of a  vacuum  created  by  diminished  US  involvement  in  the  region for  the past ten years, which the EU has failed to fill, due to its internal problems and enlargement fatigue. With the created void that the EU and the US have left in the Western Balkans, several external actors played every card up their sleeve to increase their influence. The most notable are Russia, China, and Turkey. The ultimate goal is to push out the Western presence, slow down or halt further integration of the Western Balkans into Euro\u2013Atlantic structures, and create an environment enabling the growth of their geostrategic interests. In  doing  so, all  tools  are  used such  as political,  economic,  religious  or\u2014lately  more present\u2014media influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia plays on all fronts<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia and Montenegro historically have strong cultural, religious, and political ties dating back to the eighteenth century. The invitation for NATO membership in 2015 was a turning point  and  a  sign  for  Russia  that  it  must  intensify  its  actions. In  October  2016,  a  coup attempt and a plot to assassinate the then  Prime Minister Milo \u0110ukanovic, planned for the day of the parliamentary elections, were thwarted by the arrest of several individuals. The primary objective of this act was to stop the further weakening of Russia\u2019s influence in the Western  Balkans,  but  also  to  prevent  the  last  strategic  part  of  the  Adriatic  coast  from squeezing  under  the  NATO  umbrella.  Despite  Russia\u2019s  efforts,  Montenegro  became  a NATO member in 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Soft  power levers  that  Russia  very  successfully  employs  in  Montenegro  are  not weakening;  to  the  contrary,  they  will  intensify  in  the  coming  period.  These  levers  of influence  in  Montenegro  are  the Serbian  Orthodox  Church,  the  pan-Slavic  identity, the economic presence, and lately more visible, Russian media and disinformation efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s  exploitation  of  religion  and  culture  is  most  noticeable  with  the  church.  The Metropolitanate  of  Montenegro  and  the  Littoral,  still  ecumenically  connected  to  the Serbian  Orthodox  Church,  represents  one  of  Russia\u2019s  key  channels  of  influence. Montenegro\u2019s adoption of the Law on Freedom of Religion in December 2019 was the breaking  point  in  this  regard.  Led  by  the  Serbian  Orthodox  Church,  months-long campaigns and processions followed, which the Montenegrin government characterised as  a  political  protest  directed  not  only  against  the  Government,  but  also  against Montenegro  itself  (Jankovic2020).  Even  the  Ukrainian  Orthodox  Metropolitan  of  Kyiv, Onufriy,  came  to  Montenegro  to  lead  one  of  the  processions.  This  strong  campaign eventually bore fruit, and with the help and support of the church, the coalition For the Future of Montenegro gained critical support in the parliamentary elections on August 30, 2020. Together with two other coalition partners (Black on White and Peace is Our Nation) it will form the new government in Montenegro. The long-term support for pro-Russian, mainly Serbian nationalist parties in the Montenegrin opposition (and now part of the new government), which are connected to the Serbian Orthodox Church, has finally paid off for Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia is also making powerful appeals to a common Slavic identity in Montenegro, with a  desire  to  prove  their  incompatibility  with  Western  democracies,  thus  exercising  a stronger influence.  Two  important  aspects  of  the  pan-Slavic  movement  should  not  be overlooked.  One  is the  strengthening  of  nationalist  right-wing  extremism,  visible  in  the participation  of  Montenegrin  foreign  fighters  alongside  pro-Russian  separatists  in  the Donbass (Azinovi\u0107 and Be\u0107irevi\u0107 2017). The other is the presence of two pro-Kremlin groups:  Russia\u2019s  Night Wolves  motorcycle  gang,  and  the  paramilitary  Balkan  Cossack Army. In addition, a research article published by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in  June 2020found  that  within  Montenegro,  Russia  is  viewed  as  one of  the most favourable among foreign countries and international institutions (IRI2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Apart from  the  religious,  cultural, and  identity  ties,  Russia\u2019s  influence  in  Montenegro  is channelled through its economic presence. Foreign direct investments (FDI) from Russia to Montenegro equalled \u20ac1.4 billion from 2006 to 2019, out of which the purchase of real estate represents the largest part of the investments with as much as \u20ac1.07 billion. Direct investments in Montenegrin companies amount to \u20ac131 million, and only \u20ac176 million were  invested  through  intercompany  debt.7However,  trade  between  Montenegro  and Russia  is  not  significant  as  Montenegro  is  not  dependent  on  Russian  energy  sources, and therefore  is  less  susceptible  to  Russian  energy  manipulations.  In  addition  to  FDI, tourists from Russia make up a significant part of the arrivals and overnight stays of the Montenegrin tourist structure. When Montenegro joined EU sanctions against Russia in 2014 over its annexation of Crimea, the percentage of overnight stays of Russian guests slowly started to decline from 30% in 2014 to 24.9% in 2019 (MONSTAT 2019). Tourism is  one  of  the  most  important  parts  of  the  Montenegrin  economy  and  has  the  greatest impact on GDP (Investitor 2019a). Thus, a lack of diversification and a high dependence on  tourists  coming  from  only  one  country  is  a  significant  lever  of  power  and  influence, which Russia exploits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ever  since  2015,  Russia\u2019s  media  influence  in  Montenegro  is  on  the  rise  withan abundance  of  pro-Russian  media  outlets  whose  main  objective  is  to  disseminate  the Kremlin\u2019s  agenda  (\u0160ajka\u0161  and  Tadi\u0107  2016).  However,  those  are  largely  run  by  local journalists  and  media  outlets  who  share  pro-Russian  and  anti-EU  and  anti-NATO sentiment. In addition to the well-established and popular media outlets IN4S and Borba, a  range  of  websites  such  as Sloboda, Ujedinjenje, Principor Nova  Rijec appear  and disappear as the need for their existence emerges. Their role is to portray a positive image of  Russia,  push  Moscow\u2019s  political  agenda,  and  endorse  favourable  political  parties  in Montenegro. Furthermore, Sputnik(in the Serbian language) as well as the online portals News Front and Russia  Beyond, although  located  in  Belgrade,  significantly  bolster Russia\u2019s presence as the content is constantly exchanged and republished by local media outlets  in  Montenegro.  It  is  also  important  to  emphasise  that most of  these  outlets  are present  on  social  media  and  use  it  to  increase  their  outreach  in  the  dissemination  of Russia\u2019s propaganda (Tomovic 2017).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s silent foray<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unlike Russia or Turkey, China\u2019s relations with Montenegro or any other Western Balkan country do not rely on any historical, cultural, or identity ties. Its presence in the region is comparatively new. Nevertheless, it has been progressively growing for the past decade, beginning in2008 with the onset of the global economic crisis and the power vacuum that the EU itself created. Today, China expanded its infrastructure and technology footprint in the region, mainly implemented in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the 17+1 format(CEEC 2018).8The Chinese presence in Montenegro does not seem to have political aspirations, at least not  in  the  sense  of  direct  interference  in  internal  affairs  or  foreign  policy  reorientation goals.  Their  policy, for  the most  part,  is  placed  on  economic  interests,  most notable  in financing the construction of the first section of the Bar\u2013Boljare highway. This highway is designed to connect the Montenegrin port city of Bar with Belgrade, the capital of Serbia and the largest city in the Western Balkans. Montenegro took a loan of \u20ac809 million in 2014  from  the  Export\u2013Import  Bank  of  China  to build  the  first  section  of  the  highway, constructed  by  the  China  Road  and  Bridge  Corporation  (CRBC),  a  large,  state-owned Chinese  company  (Barkin  and Vasovic  2018).  The  first  of  three  phases  will  eventually cost Montenegro around \u20ac1.3 billion, which is equivalent to a quarter of its 2018 GDP and has already caused its GDP-to-debt ratio to increase to just over 80% (Investitor 2019b; AlJazeera  Balkans2020).  Chinese  loans  come  as  a  tempting  alternative  to  the  strict financing  conditions  of  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB),  accompanied  with  less bureaucracy but with much higher interest rates (Mediterranean Affairs 2018). Critics are concerned that China could use this \u2018debt-trap diplomacy\u2019 to extract strategic concessions (Kuo and  Kommenda 2018).Contrary  to  Russia,  China  is  not trying  to hamper  the EU accession of the Western Balkans, as it can enable greater access to the European single market. Montenegro, as a coastal country and a frontrunner in the EU accession process, provides China with a strategic advantage and entry point into Europe from the Adriatic Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interestingly enough, China has become the largest investor in Montenegro with \u20ac70 million in FDI in the first half of 2020, according to the Central Bank of Montenegro report (Kajosevic 2020). The report stated that \u2018Chinese investments involved investments in companies in Montenegro or their purchase, the purchase of real estate and so-called inter-company debt\u2019. However, investment details are confidential. In 2018 and 2019, China was not mentioned among the top 50 countries investing in Montenegro, while in 2017 it barely made it on the list with only \u20ac676,000 in investment. In June 2020,Montenegro also signed a \u20ac54millioncontract with the Chinese\u2013Montenegrin consortium DEC International\u2013Bemax-BB Solar\u2013Permonte for the reconstruction of the Pljevlja thermal power plant (Kajosevic 2020). It should be noted that the Mozura Wind Park, whose construction began in 2017 and ended in 2019, is the result of Sino-Maltese-Montenegrin cooperation within the BRI framework, which is also in the midst of a corruption scandal that awaits resolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition to the economic footprint, another means of Chinese influence, devised in order to reaffirm and enhance its presence, is the cultural aspect. For that purpose, China provides scholarships and opportunities for the academic aspirations of Montenegrin students in different fields of study. It also established a Confucius Institute in Podgorica in February 2015. Its main objective is to promote Chinese culture and language, to improve the understanding of China among the locals, to connect all individuals and institutions in Montenegro that are engaged in Chinese language and culture, as well as other activities of cultural, educational, and economic cooperation between the two countries (\u0110ukanovi\u0107 2017).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey plays the history card<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

After  the  Ottoman  Empire\u2019s five  hundred years  rule  over  the  Balkans  that  only  ended some hundred years ago, Turkey continued its close historical and cultural ties with the region. Carried on the wings of the new AKP rule in the early 2000s and introduced by the ideological father of the Strategic Depth, Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey started exercising new,  multi-dimensional,  and  proactive  foreign  policy,  implemented  through  cultural diplomacy and a soft power approach. This approach is very much visible in Montenegro, where Turkey, apart from the customs, cuisine, and vocabulary, also introduced Islam, resulting in roughly one-fifth of the Montenegrin population identifying as Muslim today (MONSTAT 2011).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In terms of the political influence, relations between the two countries are very friendly, as the business climate coming from Turkey is perceived more than  favourable. Turkey\u2019s presence in Montenegro concerns part of the population that is historically, culturally, and religiously  susceptible  to  its  influence\u2014the  Islamic  Community  of  Montenegro  and  the Bosniak party, which maintain close and friendly relations with their Turkish counterparts. The agreement that the Government of Montenegro signed with the Islamic Community of Montenegro in January 2012 is worth mentioning. A move welcomed by Turkey, it gives legal and constitutional recognition to Muslims in Montenegro. This agreement has far-reaching implications for both Montenegro and the wider region and gives the Religious Affairs  Directorate  in  Ankara, Diyanet,  the  right  to  mediate  in  cases  of  disagreement between  members  of  the  Muslim  community  in  Montenegro(Bozkurt  2012).  Similar  to how  Russia  perceives  itself  as  a  protector  of  Orthodox  communities  abroad,  Turkey  is reaffirming  its  role  as  a  patron  and  protector  of  Muslim  communities in  the  Western Balkans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most notable presence of Turkey in Montenegro is represented through its economic interests.  However,  this  presence  is  not  mirrored  in  FDIs,  as  Turkey  is  only  the  tenth largest investor with \u20ac39 million of  investments  in  Montenegro  during  the  period from January 2019to April 2020, according to the Central Bank of Montenegro (RTCG2020). However, the peculiarity of the Turkish economic footprint in Montenegro is the growing number  of  companies  that  are  owned  by  individuals  and  legal  entities  from  Turkey.  In 2019, Turkey had the largest share of foreign-owned businesses in Montenegro\u20143,652 or  29.4%  compared  to  24.4%  in  2018  and  only  8.7%  in  2017(MONSTAT  2020).  The favourable  investment  climate  in  Montenegro,  with  an  initial  capital  requirement  of  one euro,  simple  procedures, 9%income  tax,  and  personal  income  tax  attracts  Turkish companies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey conducted several large investment projects in Montenegro: Tos\u00e7elik\u2019s purchase of the former Ironworks Nik\u0161i\u0107 in 2012 for \u20ac15.1 million; the purchase of Port of Adria in Bar in 2013 for \u20ac8.08 million; brand Merit that operates within the Turkish NET Holdingand has contracts for casino management in Hilton, Splendid and Avala hotels; as well as Turkish company Ginta\u015f purchasing the shopping centre Mall of Montenegro worth \u20ac50 million(Milosevic 2018). In addition, the Turkish Ziraat Bank has entered the market as well as Turkish brands Do\u011fta\u015f, Enza Home, LC Waikiki, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cooperation between the two countries is visible in the defence industry sector as well. During the visit of the former Minister of Defence of Montenegro, Predrag Boskovic,to his Turkish counterpart in October 2019, the two officials signed an Agreement on military\u2013financial cooperation as the basis for the modernisation of Montenegro\u2019s Armed Forces (Dragojlovic 2019). Playing the historical, cultural, and religious card, Turkey is primarily using its soft power to reassert its role and influence in the region (e.g.,through education, health, cultural restoration, Turkish soap operas, tourism, etc.). To that end, in 2007, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) started operating in Montenegro, undertaking cultural, infrastructure, and social projects by restoring mosques and other sacral objects, schools, and kindergartens and providing donations and equipment. Since 2007, TIKA has implemented almost three hundred projects in Montenegro worth around \u20ac20 million (FOS media 2017). Only in the field of health, Turkey has allocated more than \u20ac2  million  in  the  Montenegrin  health  system  through  TIKA  in  the  past  decade (crnagoraturska.com2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkish influence is also present through the Turkish cultural institute Yunus Emre, which promotes a favourable image of Turkey\u2019s language, history, culture, and art, as well as provides information and other services. Education is another means of Turkish influence, implemented through partnerships between universities and student exchange programs on both sides. There has been an increased number of scholarships for Montenegrin students in Turkey. More than 444 Montenegrin citizens have received Turkish scholarships so far and 28 students for the 2019\u20132020 school year(Ozan 2019). In addition, the office of Montenegro Association of Turkish Alumni (MASAT) was opened in 2018, which brought together more than 130 Montenegrin citizens who have gone through higher education in Turkey(crnagoraturska.com2018). When it comes to media influence, the Turkish footprint in this area is still marginal. There are no Turkish-language TV channels, newspapers, or radio stations in the country. However, a group of people from Montenegro and Turkey established the Montenegro\u2013Turkey portal in 2012, in order to enhance interactions and to deepen the bond between the two countries (crnagoraturska.com)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU needs to step up its game<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For quite some time, Montenegro has been regarded as one of the frontrunners in the EU integration process. Montenegro applied for EU membership in 2008 and started negotiations with the EU in 2012. After eight years of accession negotiations, all the chapters have been opened; of which three are provisionally closed(European Commission2020a). The majority of political parties in Montenegro, including the new government, are at least formally committed to the EU accession process. However, the public support for EU membership is at its lowest, with merely 54% in favour (CEDEM 2020)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Montenegro, like the rest of the Western Balkan countries, encounters difficulties in reform efforts. According to the European Commission\u2019s latest report on Montenegro\u2019s progress towards EU membership published on 6 October 2020, tensions and mistrust between political actors and a low level of trust in the electoral framework marked the observed period in terms of political criteria. In terms of governance issues, the Commission noted that recommendations had only partially been addressed and that there is a need to strengthen transparency, stakeholders\u2019 participation, and the government\u2019s capacity to implement reforms, including those of the public administration. Progress was limited to areas related to the judiciary, respect of fundamental rights, and the fight against corruption and organised crime. No progress was made in the area of freedom of expression, while the volume of disinformation has been on the rise (European Committee of the Regions 2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When it comes to the EU\u2019s economic presence, FDIs in Montenegro reached \u20ac55.3 million in 2018 while the volume of trade with the EU was at \u20ac1.38 billion  in  2019. Within  the framework of the accession process, the EU is the largest provider of financial assistance to Montenegro. \u20ac504.9 million  were  granted  in  EU  pre-accession  funds  from  2007  to 2020, \u20ac804 million were provided in European Investment Bank loans since 1999, and \u20ac172.9 million since 2009 in Western Balkans Investment Framework grants, amounting to a total of an estimated \u20ac1.7billion.  In  addition,  in  the  framework  of  the  COVID-19 response, \u20ac53 million in bilateral assistance was granted to Montenegro to cover urgent health needs and economic and social recovery, as well as a \u20ac455-million-package for regional  economic  reactivation. Also, \u20ac60 million were approved by the EU for Macro-Financial Assistance and the European Investment Bank is providing \u20ac1.7 billion to the region.  Moreover,  visa-free  travel  to  the  EU  was  introduced  in  December  2009,  which greatly empowered the mobility of people as well as student exchange. Between 2015 and  2020,  over  4,188  participants  took  part  in  academic  and  youth  exchanges  under ERASMUS+ (European Commission2020b)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Montenegro\u2019s cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been very successful, as the EBRD has invested \u20ac710 million in nearly 74 projects over the last 14 years (EBRD 2020). Nevertheless, the cooperation and investments coming from the EU are insufficiently promoted and lack visibility. It seems like the EU\u2019s influence in Montenegro, despite the accession process, is fading away with increased Chinese and Russian political and economic clout. The EU will need to seriously step up its game in Montenegro if it wants to maintain its role and influence, as Montenegro is undergoing internal ruffles and a deepening of religious and ethnic rifts, which combined with strong external pressures  make it susceptible to malign foreign influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

US still indispensable<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The recent history of diplomatic relations between the US and Montenegro began right after Montenegro regained independence in 2006, with the formal establishment of a US Embassy soon after. However, the history of political contacts, friendship and relations go well beyond that. Back in the day, after World War I, the USA was a great supporter of Montenegro\u2019s independence, despite the fact that it was unsuccessful at that time. It is also important to mention that during the 1990s and in the aftermath of the wars in former Yugoslavia,  Milo \u0110ukanovic was one of the very few politicians in the region that the Clinton  administration  was  in  communication  with,  which  very  much  shaped  and strengthened these relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today, these relations and US influence are notable within the framework of support for Montenegro\u2019s Euro\u2013Atlantic integration path, with NATO-membership having been achieved in 2017. This support includes programs and assistance in fighting organised crime and corruption, strengthening civil society, encouraging free and independent journalism, and promoting stability in the Balkans. The visits to Montenegro from both Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Vice President Mike Pence are strong indicators of the importance of Montenegro for the stability in the region and the US\u2013Montenegro partnership in this part of Europe. In addition, the appointment of a Special Envoy from the State Department for the Western Balkans represents an impetus to the EU enlargement policy and further integration of this region. This is an important indicator of the United States indispensable role in Montenegro and the wider region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As indicated before, the US had an important and strong influence in Montenegro when it comes to security policy, primarily concerning NATO membership. \u2018The United States has been a staunch, reliable, and precious partner of Montenegro in achieving the vision of a Euro-Atlantic and European country\u2019(Markovic 2017). Within this area, the US has provided financial support to the Montenegrin Armed Forces from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program with over $8.2 million for an equipment upgrade. Within the United States European Command\u2019s (EUCOM) Humanitarian Assistance Program that began in Montenegro in 2008, over $3 million have been or will be used to fund over 20 different projects. The US has donated fire trucks, firefighting equipment, and other emergency vehicles to municipalities throughout Montenegro. Under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, Montenegro has received over $4 million in funding. With this financing, they have sent approximately 100 students to military courses in the United States. Equally, US presence in Montenegro is visible in different programs such as the Export Control and Border Security Program (EXBS) that has thus far committed over $4 million to training and equipment with 634 persons attending EXBS organised trainings since 2010. Additionally, the US presence is reflected in assistance to the justice system and police administration through providing high-level skills and knowledge training to over 2000justice sector officials in the past 10 years and over $5millionfor training, equipment grants, and educational initiatives. The US assisted in the development of a new Office of the Special Prosecutor, which focuses on organised crime, corruption, and other forms of serious crime. Furthermore, it provided training to over 4,500 justice sector officials in the past 8 years and allocated $12 million in assistance (U.S. Embassy in Montenegro 2020). Between 2001 and 2013, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) delivered $243.3 million in assistance to Montenegro. Throughout its tenure, USAID has focused on economic growth, good governance, and improving the quality of Montenegrins\u2019 lives (USAID 2013).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When it comes to the public perception in Montenegro, according to the CEDEM public opinion poll from August 2020, 17.2% of respondents think that Montenegro should rely on the US in its foreign policy, as opposed to the 19.5% who think that it should be Russia or the 26.1% who want to rely on the EU.In terms of FDI, US investments are still very low. For example, for the first half of 2020,the total amount of investments coming from the US was \u20ac21.5 million (Kajosevic 2020). According to the US Embassy\u2019s fact sheet, 50 American companies operate in Montenegro and the top 6 US investors have invested over \u20ac300 million in Montenegro since its independence (US Embassy in Montenegro 2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding public diplomacy outreach, the Education USA Center offers support for those that would like to study in the US. More than 120 Montenegrin students are currently studying at US Universities. Since 2006, almost 130 projects worth nearly $1.9 million were supported to strengthen democracy, respect for human rights, and civil society. In addition, American Corners are operating in Podgorica, Pljevlja, and Cetinje that offer literature, lectures, English language discussion clubs and events, cultural exchange, and networking. When it comes to media, there are no US media outlets present in Montenegro. However, the media environment is dominated by the ping-pong game between pro-Western and pro-Russian media outlets, presenting the other as an adversary. In addition, US TV shows and movies that portray US culture and way of life are very popular and omnipresent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Montenegro   aspired   to   join   Euro\u2013Atlantic   institutions   even   before   regaining   its independence  in  2006.  Subsequently,  it  has  become  a  member  of  NATO,  while  EU membership still awaits to be accomplished. Despite strong aspirations towards the West, the shifts in the global geopolitical balance of power and several pressing challenges in other  regions  caused a  shrinkage  of  the  US  and  EU  influence  and  created  a  void  that non-Western actors readily embraced. Russia\u2019s extensive presence directly or indirectly uses all means of influence, from religion, culture, history, identity, to the economy and media  presence.  Their  goal  is  to  influence  the  country  politically  and  with  the  recently elected political structures that include pro-Russian, mainly Serbian nationalist parties, it remains  to  be  seen  how  this  new  government  will  position  itself regarding the  EU  and NATO, and  more importantly ,towards Russia. Their media influence and dissemination of propaganda and disinformation further promotes Russia\u2019s agenda. On the other hand, Turkey and China have increased their presence, but mainly in terms of their economic interests, with the addition of soft power means of cultural and educational connections. China\u2019s agenda regarding the development of huge infrastructure projects and provision of loans to Montenegro poses a very serious question on the long-term consequences of Chinese money\u2014economic breakthrough or debt-trap? The economic presence of Turkey is on the rise since it has the largest share of foreign-owned businesses in Montenegro, as well as cultural connections and appeal, at least for some parts of the society. Although Montenegro and other Western Balkan countries aspire to EU membership, the diminished presence of the EU and reduced influence of the US over the past decade that supports these aspirations created space for a stronger presence of other regional and global powers. Together with rising social tensions and nationalist right-wing extremism, both the EU and the US need to consider and adopt a more clear and comprehensive strategy for the entire region in order not to be pushed out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Azra Karastanovi\u0107, Program Manager at the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, contributed to a broad study on the strategic role of the external actors in the Western Balkans. This is a joint publication of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, the Political Academy of the Austrian People \u0301s Party and the Austrian Institute for European […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":15424,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"","_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[31,17,1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-15423","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-featured","category-istaknuto","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15423","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15423"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15423\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":19116,"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15423\/revisions\/19116"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15423"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15423"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ascg.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15423"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}