Azra Karastanović, Program Manager at the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, contributed to a broad study on the strategic role of the external actors in the Western Balkans. This is a joint publication of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, the Political Academy of the Austrian People ́s Party and the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy. “Montenegro between the East and West: Who will prevail in the ‘land of seas and mountains’?” is the topic of Azra’s article. We are conveying the article integrally. The whole study can be found on the following link.
Abstract
Montenegro ignites the strategic interests of the regional and global powers. Particularly, for the past decade, it has been under influence of both Western and non-Western actors. This paper seeks to identify, analyse, and present the means of influence of five major players in Montenegro—Russia, China, Turkey, the EU, and the US. Each of the external actors’ footprint within Montenegro has been assessed against the respective factors of influence: economic, political, security, religious, and media. In this context, external actors’ influence is understood as the capacity or power of these actors to produce effects on the political, economic, and social affairs within the country that favour their national interests. The paper shows the growing presence and influence of non-Western actors within Montenegro, as the prevalence of the EU and US influence has been decreasing for the past decade and lacks visibility despite strong economic and political presence.
Keywords:Montenegro–US–EU–Turkey–China–Russia–footprint–influence
Introduction
Montenegro is one of the seven countries born out of the violent dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Even though it was mostly spared from the violence and bloodshed of the war, as one of the smallest countries in the Western Balkans, its political, economic, and social progress was very much conditioned by a series of internal and external factors—in the first place by efforts to regain its independence. This endeavour, which was ten years in the making, was crowned in 2006 with the historic independence referendum. However, this was only the beginning. Regaining independence meant strengthening institutions, stepping out on the international scene, building up the economy, closing the gap, and unifying society. An endeavour which is still in the making. Since regaining its independence in 2006, Montenegro set out two principal foreign-policy goals—becoming part of the EU and of NATO. The latter one was accomplished in 2017,despite a strong backlash and efforts by external actors (primarily Russia) to prevent it. The first still waits to be achieved, even though Montenegro is considered one of the frontrunners for future EU enlargement. Growing non-Western influence is a consequence of a vacuum created by diminished US involvement in the region for the past ten years, which the EU has failed to fill, due to its internal problems and enlargement fatigue. With the created void that the EU and the US have left in the Western Balkans, several external actors played every card up their sleeve to increase their influence. The most notable are Russia, China, and Turkey. The ultimate goal is to push out the Western presence, slow down or halt further integration of the Western Balkans into Euro–Atlantic structures, and create an environment enabling the growth of their geostrategic interests. In doing so, all tools are used such as political, economic, religious or—lately more present—media influence.
Russia plays on all fronts
Russia and Montenegro historically have strong cultural, religious, and political ties dating back to the eighteenth century. The invitation for NATO membership in 2015 was a turning point and a sign for Russia that it must intensify its actions. In October 2016, a coup attempt and a plot to assassinate the then Prime Minister Milo Đukanovic, planned for the day of the parliamentary elections, were thwarted by the arrest of several individuals. The primary objective of this act was to stop the further weakening of Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans, but also to prevent the last strategic part of the Adriatic coast from squeezing under the NATO umbrella. Despite Russia’s efforts, Montenegro became a NATO member in 2017.
Soft power levers that Russia very successfully employs in Montenegro are not weakening; to the contrary, they will intensify in the coming period. These levers of influence in Montenegro are the Serbian Orthodox Church, the pan-Slavic identity, the economic presence, and lately more visible, Russian media and disinformation efforts.
Russia’s exploitation of religion and culture is most noticeable with the church. The Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral, still ecumenically connected to the Serbian Orthodox Church, represents one of Russia’s key channels of influence. Montenegro’s adoption of the Law on Freedom of Religion in December 2019 was the breaking point in this regard. Led by the Serbian Orthodox Church, months-long campaigns and processions followed, which the Montenegrin government characterised as a political protest directed not only against the Government, but also against Montenegro itself (Jankovic2020). Even the Ukrainian Orthodox Metropolitan of Kyiv, Onufriy, came to Montenegro to lead one of the processions. This strong campaign eventually bore fruit, and with the help and support of the church, the coalition For the Future of Montenegro gained critical support in the parliamentary elections on August 30, 2020. Together with two other coalition partners (Black on White and Peace is Our Nation) it will form the new government in Montenegro. The long-term support for pro-Russian, mainly Serbian nationalist parties in the Montenegrin opposition (and now part of the new government), which are connected to the Serbian Orthodox Church, has finally paid off for Russia.
Russia is also making powerful appeals to a common Slavic identity in Montenegro, with a desire to prove their incompatibility with Western democracies, thus exercising a stronger influence. Two important aspects of the pan-Slavic movement should not be overlooked. One is the strengthening of nationalist right-wing extremism, visible in the participation of Montenegrin foreign fighters alongside pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass (Azinović and Bećirević 2017). The other is the presence of two pro-Kremlin groups: Russia’s Night Wolves motorcycle gang, and the paramilitary Balkan Cossack Army. In addition, a research article published by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in June 2020found that within Montenegro, Russia is viewed as one of the most favourable among foreign countries and international institutions (IRI2020).
Apart from the religious, cultural, and identity ties, Russia’s influence in Montenegro is channelled through its economic presence. Foreign direct investments (FDI) from Russia to Montenegro equalled €1.4 billion from 2006 to 2019, out of which the purchase of real estate represents the largest part of the investments with as much as €1.07 billion. Direct investments in Montenegrin companies amount to €131 million, and only €176 million were invested through intercompany debt.7However, trade between Montenegro and Russia is not significant as Montenegro is not dependent on Russian energy sources, and therefore is less susceptible to Russian energy manipulations. In addition to FDI, tourists from Russia make up a significant part of the arrivals and overnight stays of the Montenegrin tourist structure. When Montenegro joined EU sanctions against Russia in 2014 over its annexation of Crimea, the percentage of overnight stays of Russian guests slowly started to decline from 30% in 2014 to 24.9% in 2019 (MONSTAT 2019). Tourism is one of the most important parts of the Montenegrin economy and has the greatest impact on GDP (Investitor 2019a). Thus, a lack of diversification and a high dependence on tourists coming from only one country is a significant lever of power and influence, which Russia exploits.
Ever since 2015, Russia’s media influence in Montenegro is on the rise withan abundance of pro-Russian media outlets whose main objective is to disseminate the Kremlin’s agenda (Šajkaš and Tadić 2016). However, those are largely run by local journalists and media outlets who share pro-Russian and anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiment. In addition to the well-established and popular media outlets IN4S and Borba, a range of websites such as Sloboda, Ujedinjenje, Principor Nova Rijec appear and disappear as the need for their existence emerges. Their role is to portray a positive image of Russia, push Moscow’s political agenda, and endorse favourable political parties in Montenegro. Furthermore, Sputnik(in the Serbian language) as well as the online portals News Front and Russia Beyond, although located in Belgrade, significantly bolster Russia’s presence as the content is constantly exchanged and republished by local media outlets in Montenegro. It is also important to emphasise that most of these outlets are present on social media and use it to increase their outreach in the dissemination of Russia’s propaganda (Tomovic 2017).
China’s silent foray
Unlike Russia or Turkey, China’s relations with Montenegro or any other Western Balkan country do not rely on any historical, cultural, or identity ties. Its presence in the region is comparatively new. Nevertheless, it has been progressively growing for the past decade, beginning in2008 with the onset of the global economic crisis and the power vacuum that the EU itself created. Today, China expanded its infrastructure and technology footprint in the region, mainly implemented in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the 17+1 format(CEEC 2018).8The Chinese presence in Montenegro does not seem to have political aspirations, at least not in the sense of direct interference in internal affairs or foreign policy reorientation goals. Their policy, for the most part, is placed on economic interests, most notable in financing the construction of the first section of the Bar–Boljare highway. This highway is designed to connect the Montenegrin port city of Bar with Belgrade, the capital of Serbia and the largest city in the Western Balkans. Montenegro took a loan of €809 million in 2014 from the Export–Import Bank of China to build the first section of the highway, constructed by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), a large, state-owned Chinese company (Barkin and Vasovic 2018). The first of three phases will eventually cost Montenegro around €1.3 billion, which is equivalent to a quarter of its 2018 GDP and has already caused its GDP-to-debt ratio to increase to just over 80% (Investitor 2019b; AlJazeera Balkans2020). Chinese loans come as a tempting alternative to the strict financing conditions of the European Investment Bank (EIB), accompanied with less bureaucracy but with much higher interest rates (Mediterranean Affairs 2018). Critics are concerned that China could use this ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ to extract strategic concessions (Kuo and Kommenda 2018).Contrary to Russia, China is not trying to hamper the EU accession of the Western Balkans, as it can enable greater access to the European single market. Montenegro, as a coastal country and a frontrunner in the EU accession process, provides China with a strategic advantage and entry point into Europe from the Adriatic Sea.
Interestingly enough, China has become the largest investor in Montenegro with €70 million in FDI in the first half of 2020, according to the Central Bank of Montenegro report (Kajosevic 2020). The report stated that ‘Chinese investments involved investments in companies in Montenegro or their purchase, the purchase of real estate and so-called inter-company debt’. However, investment details are confidential. In 2018 and 2019, China was not mentioned among the top 50 countries investing in Montenegro, while in 2017 it barely made it on the list with only €676,000 in investment. In June 2020,Montenegro also signed a €54millioncontract with the Chinese–Montenegrin consortium DEC International–Bemax-BB Solar–Permonte for the reconstruction of the Pljevlja thermal power plant (Kajosevic 2020). It should be noted that the Mozura Wind Park, whose construction began in 2017 and ended in 2019, is the result of Sino-Maltese-Montenegrin cooperation within the BRI framework, which is also in the midst of a corruption scandal that awaits resolution.
In addition to the economic footprint, another means of Chinese influence, devised in order to reaffirm and enhance its presence, is the cultural aspect. For that purpose, China provides scholarships and opportunities for the academic aspirations of Montenegrin students in different fields of study. It also established a Confucius Institute in Podgorica in February 2015. Its main objective is to promote Chinese culture and language, to improve the understanding of China among the locals, to connect all individuals and institutions in Montenegro that are engaged in Chinese language and culture, as well as other activities of cultural, educational, and economic cooperation between the two countries (Đukanović 2017).
Turkey plays the history card
After the Ottoman Empire’s five hundred years rule over the Balkans that only ended some hundred years ago, Turkey continued its close historical and cultural ties with the region. Carried on the wings of the new AKP rule in the early 2000s and introduced by the ideological father of the Strategic Depth, Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey started exercising new, multi-dimensional, and proactive foreign policy, implemented through cultural diplomacy and a soft power approach. This approach is very much visible in Montenegro, where Turkey, apart from the customs, cuisine, and vocabulary, also introduced Islam, resulting in roughly one-fifth of the Montenegrin population identifying as Muslim today (MONSTAT 2011).
In terms of the political influence, relations between the two countries are very friendly, as the business climate coming from Turkey is perceived more than favourable. Turkey’s presence in Montenegro concerns part of the population that is historically, culturally, and religiously susceptible to its influence—the Islamic Community of Montenegro and the Bosniak party, which maintain close and friendly relations with their Turkish counterparts. The agreement that the Government of Montenegro signed with the Islamic Community of Montenegro in January 2012 is worth mentioning. A move welcomed by Turkey, it gives legal and constitutional recognition to Muslims in Montenegro. This agreement has far-reaching implications for both Montenegro and the wider region and gives the Religious Affairs Directorate in Ankara, Diyanet, the right to mediate in cases of disagreement between members of the Muslim community in Montenegro(Bozkurt 2012). Similar to how Russia perceives itself as a protector of Orthodox communities abroad, Turkey is reaffirming its role as a patron and protector of Muslim communities in the Western Balkans.
The most notable presence of Turkey in Montenegro is represented through its economic interests. However, this presence is not mirrored in FDIs, as Turkey is only the tenth largest investor with €39 million of investments in Montenegro during the period from January 2019to April 2020, according to the Central Bank of Montenegro (RTCG2020). However, the peculiarity of the Turkish economic footprint in Montenegro is the growing number of companies that are owned by individuals and legal entities from Turkey. In 2019, Turkey had the largest share of foreign-owned businesses in Montenegro—3,652 or 29.4% compared to 24.4% in 2018 and only 8.7% in 2017(MONSTAT 2020). The favourable investment climate in Montenegro, with an initial capital requirement of one euro, simple procedures, 9%income tax, and personal income tax attracts Turkish companies.
Turkey conducted several large investment projects in Montenegro: Tosçelik’s purchase of the former Ironworks Nikšić in 2012 for €15.1 million; the purchase of Port of Adria in Bar in 2013 for €8.08 million; brand Merit that operates within the Turkish NET Holdingand has contracts for casino management in Hilton, Splendid and Avala hotels; as well as Turkish company Gintaş purchasing the shopping centre Mall of Montenegro worth €50 million(Milosevic 2018). In addition, the Turkish Ziraat Bank has entered the market as well as Turkish brands Doğtaş, Enza Home, LC Waikiki, etc.
Cooperation between the two countries is visible in the defence industry sector as well. During the visit of the former Minister of Defence of Montenegro, Predrag Boskovic,to his Turkish counterpart in October 2019, the two officials signed an Agreement on military–financial cooperation as the basis for the modernisation of Montenegro’s Armed Forces (Dragojlovic 2019). Playing the historical, cultural, and religious card, Turkey is primarily using its soft power to reassert its role and influence in the region (e.g.,through education, health, cultural restoration, Turkish soap operas, tourism, etc.). To that end, in 2007, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) started operating in Montenegro, undertaking cultural, infrastructure, and social projects by restoring mosques and other sacral objects, schools, and kindergartens and providing donations and equipment. Since 2007, TIKA has implemented almost three hundred projects in Montenegro worth around €20 million (FOS media 2017). Only in the field of health, Turkey has allocated more than €2 million in the Montenegrin health system through TIKA in the past decade (crnagoraturska.com2019).
Turkish influence is also present through the Turkish cultural institute Yunus Emre, which promotes a favourable image of Turkey’s language, history, culture, and art, as well as provides information and other services. Education is another means of Turkish influence, implemented through partnerships between universities and student exchange programs on both sides. There has been an increased number of scholarships for Montenegrin students in Turkey. More than 444 Montenegrin citizens have received Turkish scholarships so far and 28 students for the 2019–2020 school year(Ozan 2019). In addition, the office of Montenegro Association of Turkish Alumni (MASAT) was opened in 2018, which brought together more than 130 Montenegrin citizens who have gone through higher education in Turkey(crnagoraturska.com2018). When it comes to media influence, the Turkish footprint in this area is still marginal. There are no Turkish-language TV channels, newspapers, or radio stations in the country. However, a group of people from Montenegro and Turkey established the Montenegro–Turkey portal in 2012, in order to enhance interactions and to deepen the bond between the two countries (crnagoraturska.com)
The EU needs to step up its game
For quite some time, Montenegro has been regarded as one of the frontrunners in the EU integration process. Montenegro applied for EU membership in 2008 and started negotiations with the EU in 2012. After eight years of accession negotiations, all the chapters have been opened; of which three are provisionally closed(European Commission2020a). The majority of political parties in Montenegro, including the new government, are at least formally committed to the EU accession process. However, the public support for EU membership is at its lowest, with merely 54% in favour (CEDEM 2020)
Montenegro, like the rest of the Western Balkan countries, encounters difficulties in reform efforts. According to the European Commission’s latest report on Montenegro’s progress towards EU membership published on 6 October 2020, tensions and mistrust between political actors and a low level of trust in the electoral framework marked the observed period in terms of political criteria. In terms of governance issues, the Commission noted that recommendations had only partially been addressed and that there is a need to strengthen transparency, stakeholders’ participation, and the government’s capacity to implement reforms, including those of the public administration. Progress was limited to areas related to the judiciary, respect of fundamental rights, and the fight against corruption and organised crime. No progress was made in the area of freedom of expression, while the volume of disinformation has been on the rise (European Committee of the Regions 2020).
When it comes to the EU’s economic presence, FDIs in Montenegro reached €55.3 million in 2018 while the volume of trade with the EU was at €1.38 billion in 2019. Within the framework of the accession process, the EU is the largest provider of financial assistance to Montenegro. €504.9 million were granted in EU pre-accession funds from 2007 to 2020, €804 million were provided in European Investment Bank loans since 1999, and €172.9 million since 2009 in Western Balkans Investment Framework grants, amounting to a total of an estimated €1.7billion. In addition, in the framework of the COVID-19 response, €53 million in bilateral assistance was granted to Montenegro to cover urgent health needs and economic and social recovery, as well as a €455-million-package for regional economic reactivation. Also, €60 million were approved by the EU for Macro-Financial Assistance and the European Investment Bank is providing €1.7 billion to the region. Moreover, visa-free travel to the EU was introduced in December 2009, which greatly empowered the mobility of people as well as student exchange. Between 2015 and 2020, over 4,188 participants took part in academic and youth exchanges under ERASMUS+ (European Commission2020b)
Montenegro’s cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been very successful, as the EBRD has invested €710 million in nearly 74 projects over the last 14 years (EBRD 2020). Nevertheless, the cooperation and investments coming from the EU are insufficiently promoted and lack visibility. It seems like the EU’s influence in Montenegro, despite the accession process, is fading away with increased Chinese and Russian political and economic clout. The EU will need to seriously step up its game in Montenegro if it wants to maintain its role and influence, as Montenegro is undergoing internal ruffles and a deepening of religious and ethnic rifts, which combined with strong external pressures make it susceptible to malign foreign influence.
US still indispensable
The recent history of diplomatic relations between the US and Montenegro began right after Montenegro regained independence in 2006, with the formal establishment of a US Embassy soon after. However, the history of political contacts, friendship and relations go well beyond that. Back in the day, after World War I, the USA was a great supporter of Montenegro’s independence, despite the fact that it was unsuccessful at that time. It is also important to mention that during the 1990s and in the aftermath of the wars in former Yugoslavia, Milo Đukanovic was one of the very few politicians in the region that the Clinton administration was in communication with, which very much shaped and strengthened these relations.
Today, these relations and US influence are notable within the framework of support for Montenegro’s Euro–Atlantic integration path, with NATO-membership having been achieved in 2017. This support includes programs and assistance in fighting organised crime and corruption, strengthening civil society, encouraging free and independent journalism, and promoting stability in the Balkans. The visits to Montenegro from both Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Vice President Mike Pence are strong indicators of the importance of Montenegro for the stability in the region and the US–Montenegro partnership in this part of Europe. In addition, the appointment of a Special Envoy from the State Department for the Western Balkans represents an impetus to the EU enlargement policy and further integration of this region. This is an important indicator of the United States indispensable role in Montenegro and the wider region.
As indicated before, the US had an important and strong influence in Montenegro when it comes to security policy, primarily concerning NATO membership. ‘The United States has been a staunch, reliable, and precious partner of Montenegro in achieving the vision of a Euro-Atlantic and European country’(Markovic 2017). Within this area, the US has provided financial support to the Montenegrin Armed Forces from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program with over $8.2 million for an equipment upgrade. Within the United States European Command’s (EUCOM) Humanitarian Assistance Program that began in Montenegro in 2008, over $3 million have been or will be used to fund over 20 different projects. The US has donated fire trucks, firefighting equipment, and other emergency vehicles to municipalities throughout Montenegro. Under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, Montenegro has received over $4 million in funding. With this financing, they have sent approximately 100 students to military courses in the United States. Equally, US presence in Montenegro is visible in different programs such as the Export Control and Border Security Program (EXBS) that has thus far committed over $4 million to training and equipment with 634 persons attending EXBS organised trainings since 2010. Additionally, the US presence is reflected in assistance to the justice system and police administration through providing high-level skills and knowledge training to over 2000justice sector officials in the past 10 years and over $5millionfor training, equipment grants, and educational initiatives. The US assisted in the development of a new Office of the Special Prosecutor, which focuses on organised crime, corruption, and other forms of serious crime. Furthermore, it provided training to over 4,500 justice sector officials in the past 8 years and allocated $12 million in assistance (U.S. Embassy in Montenegro 2020). Between 2001 and 2013, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) delivered $243.3 million in assistance to Montenegro. Throughout its tenure, USAID has focused on economic growth, good governance, and improving the quality of Montenegrins’ lives (USAID 2013).
When it comes to the public perception in Montenegro, according to the CEDEM public opinion poll from August 2020, 17.2% of respondents think that Montenegro should rely on the US in its foreign policy, as opposed to the 19.5% who think that it should be Russia or the 26.1% who want to rely on the EU.In terms of FDI, US investments are still very low. For example, for the first half of 2020,the total amount of investments coming from the US was €21.5 million (Kajosevic 2020). According to the US Embassy’s fact sheet, 50 American companies operate in Montenegro and the top 6 US investors have invested over €300 million in Montenegro since its independence (US Embassy in Montenegro 2020).
Regarding public diplomacy outreach, the Education USA Center offers support for those that would like to study in the US. More than 120 Montenegrin students are currently studying at US Universities. Since 2006, almost 130 projects worth nearly $1.9 million were supported to strengthen democracy, respect for human rights, and civil society. In addition, American Corners are operating in Podgorica, Pljevlja, and Cetinje that offer literature, lectures, English language discussion clubs and events, cultural exchange, and networking. When it comes to media, there are no US media outlets present in Montenegro. However, the media environment is dominated by the ping-pong game between pro-Western and pro-Russian media outlets, presenting the other as an adversary. In addition, US TV shows and movies that portray US culture and way of life are very popular and omnipresent.
Conclusion
Montenegro aspired to join Euro–Atlantic institutions even before regaining its independence in 2006. Subsequently, it has become a member of NATO, while EU membership still awaits to be accomplished. Despite strong aspirations towards the West, the shifts in the global geopolitical balance of power and several pressing challenges in other regions caused a shrinkage of the US and EU influence and created a void that non-Western actors readily embraced. Russia’s extensive presence directly or indirectly uses all means of influence, from religion, culture, history, identity, to the economy and media presence. Their goal is to influence the country politically and with the recently elected political structures that include pro-Russian, mainly Serbian nationalist parties, it remains to be seen how this new government will position itself regarding the EU and NATO, and more importantly ,towards Russia. Their media influence and dissemination of propaganda and disinformation further promotes Russia’s agenda. On the other hand, Turkey and China have increased their presence, but mainly in terms of their economic interests, with the addition of soft power means of cultural and educational connections. China’s agenda regarding the development of huge infrastructure projects and provision of loans to Montenegro poses a very serious question on the long-term consequences of Chinese money—economic breakthrough or debt-trap? The economic presence of Turkey is on the rise since it has the largest share of foreign-owned businesses in Montenegro, as well as cultural connections and appeal, at least for some parts of the society. Although Montenegro and other Western Balkan countries aspire to EU membership, the diminished presence of the EU and reduced influence of the US over the past decade that supports these aspirations created space for a stronger presence of other regional and global powers. Together with rising social tensions and nationalist right-wing extremism, both the EU and the US need to consider and adopt a more clear and comprehensive strategy for the entire region in order not to be pushed out.
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